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PARMENIDES AND AUTHORITY.

THE reason which seems to be given by Parmenides for his theory of being is that any other theory is inconceivable (R. P. 114). The same point of view certainly prevails in Zeno, who relies entirely on formal logic to prove his puzzles. But it is surely not revolutionary to suggest that this procedure involves the working hypothesis that the structure of the universe is like the structure of thought, that to understand the universe is to read into it the characteristics of human reason. That was easy enough when men were ready to admit that knowledge could only maintain between things which were alike, but it is a bit suspicious when men insist that the likeness between subject and object is irrelevant. Yet to argue that a body of propositions about an organic whole must itself be an organic whole, or that a single proposition can never be wholly true because its subject matter is never wholly real, is not very different from arguing, as Plotinus does, that we cannot know evil by any of our organs because our organs are all good, or, as Bergson does, that we cannot know what is dynamic by means of the reason because the reason is static. It is not dissimilar to saying that a body of propositions about unreal facts must be inconsistent or that knowledge of white objects must be white and of black objects black. To be sure if there is no legitimate distinction between thought and its subject-matter, if the two coalesce, these conclusions hold good.

As a matter of fact even the most self-conscious philosophers have read into their subject matter most of their own characteristics. Their tastes have become hypostasized and justified in the most extraordinary manner. The usual reader of philosophical literature hardly appreciates how inconclusive and dogmatic the great works of the philosophic temperament are until he had been enabled to speculate upon them without the books to comfort him and the libraries to bolster up his doubts. Service in the army, for instance, must have shown many students of philosophy that their subject is not so much a guide to life as a picture of life, that much more than lyric poetry is it expressive of individual personality. In the army one meets men who have never seen Burnet's *Early Greek Philosophy* and yet are splendid examples of the perfect Heracleitean or the Parmenidean. Indeed the very kernel of military discipline is the doctrine, "It is," about which there can be no dispute and no question. The army dogma necessitated by the practical needs of war has led military men to believe that in authority you have something—perhaps the only thing—which is substantial. Authority has all the earmarks of sovereignty. It cannot be changed from without, for in its universe it is all-inclusive. It may alter its visible form, but in reality it is immutable. It is blasphemy to seek its origin, for it has neither beginning nor end; it is; "nor will the force of truth suffer aught to arise besides itself from that which is not." If Parmenides had set out to write an accurate description of the authority of a commander-in-chief, he could have done no better than to have written his poem as it now stands.

It is not likely, is it, that people who had never dreamed of Elea should be eleatic, unless there was something in the work of Parmenides which was expressive of a fundamental and widely spread human attitude. One can go

into the expressions of men who have an interest in supporting authority and find eleaticism; one can go into eleaticism and find support for authority. What conclusion is one to draw from this except that metaphysics has a generous element of self-expression in it?

To be sure all philosophers will not admit all this. When they are empirical they maintain that they derive their opinion from facts; when they are rational, they maintain that they derive them from reason. These two weapons are almost omnipotent. They are too powerful, however, for they can justify almost anything.

As early as Plato the Eleatic qualities had become much more than the identification marks of substance, or Space, or being, or whatever it was they are supposed to identify; they had become the signs of great value. Whatever else the ideas were, they were the most worthwhile things in the universe, and it cannot be denied that they were Eleatic; for they were unchangeable (*Phaedo*, 78), "always the same, uncreated and indestructible," never being diminished nor increased (*Tim.*, 51). They were moreover substantial, meaning absolutely sovereign,¹ existing *χωρίς*. But these were exactly the characteristics which Parmenides had assigned to the subject of his *ἔστί* or could easily be read into them if one were anxious to find something in the world to which faith could be pinned with reliance. It was these qualities which made the ideas worth knowing and everything valuable (*Phileb.*, 67; *Tim.* 29). It is because both pleasure and the mind are wanting in self sufficiency and in adequacy and perfection that their claims to be the absolute good are disproved. It is because the world is the fairest of creations and that the creator is the best of

¹ See Zeller, *Plato and the Older Academy*, tr. by Alleyne and Goodwin, London, 1888, p. 240, n. 40, where the word "substance" is well defined as "generally anything subsisting for itself, forming no inherent part or attribute of anything else, and having no need of any substratum separate from itself." One can see from this careful definition how practical a meaning there was in the term.

causes that the pattern after which it was made must have been unchangeable and uncreated.

This type of philosophy was characteristic of Greek thinkers. With the possible exception of the philosophies of Empedocles and Democritus, all Greek philosophies, even that of Heracleitus, were a seeking after something permanent, stable, sovereign in its own right. Their *arche* was little more than something like the It of Parmenides. When we read in the histories of philosophy, "Thales said that water was the *arche*," ought we not to revise it to read, "Thales said that the *arche* was water." And this is what Aristotle did say in his account of his predecessors.² In the fragments of Anaximander, the similarity is especially interesting. It is complete except that Anaximander made his *arche* infinite, as every one knows, but his reason for doing so, says Aristotle (*Physics*, Bk. III, Ch. IV, 14), was that he believed it made the *arche* divine. He did not prove that the *arche* was infinite, nor did he discover that it was infinite; he wanted it to have all those characteristics which would dignify it in his eyes. Was it a different reason which made the Pythagoreans identify, as the traditional historians tell us, permanent and immutable mathematical relations with the *arche*? Windelband, in his *History of Philosophy*, seems to believe that their eternity, their immutability, their immobility, were sufficient proof of their metaphysical importance. They are the qualities which to a Greek apparently made life worth while, and hence they were the qualities of the *arche*. Who can give any *a priori* reason why the universe must be ultimately one or many, temporal or eternal, permanent or changing? Is not the reason in the long run likely to be that of Parmenides in the Platonic dialog named after him, "If a man fixing his attention on these and like diffi-

² But see Benn's *The Greek Philosophers*, London, 1882, Vol. I, p. 7, and Burnet's *Early Greek Philosophy*, 2d ed., London, 1908, p. 48.

culties, does away with ideas of things and will not admit that every individual thing has its own determinate idea which is always one and the same, he will have nothing on which his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning, as you seem to me to have particularly noted" (*Parmen.*, 135).

At this point one is properly met with the objection that Heracleitus at least believed in impermanence. Yet he ordered his flux; the way up and the way down were the same (R. P., 36d); fire, the great destroyer, was itself eternal, "with measures kindling, and measures going out" (R. P., 35; Burnet, p. 148). This is a dynamic philosophy if you will, but it is a corrected dynamism. It may seem relativistic; but it has a fixed reference point. Whether or not Heracleitus's Logos had the connotation of the Stoics'—and they thought it had³—the most literal reading of the fragments shows us that the flux was definitely controlled by something from without, which was sovereign and independent of change. "The sun," he says in a well-known passage, "will not overstep his measures; if he does, the Erinyes, the handmaids of Justice, will find him out" (R. P., 39; Burnet, p. 149). The traditional interpretation of Heracleitus would make him out to be a denier of substance and permanence. Yet if the mutilated fragments mean anything, they mean that however dynamic the world is, something there is which directs its flow. No wonder he has been interpreted as the rationalizer of the Mysteries. His fragments might even be taken as tracts to reveal the Reason immanent and concealed in Irrational Nature, a sort of Hellenic Bridgewater Treatise.

It is not hard to see why the Greek philosophers with one or two exceptions sped so unfailingly toward whatever was permanent and reliable. From Thales to Aristotle

³ So does Benn, *op. cit.*, I, p. 24, and of course Windelband, p. 180. But see Burnet, p. 146, n. 3.

these men were aristocrats. According to tradition Thales besides being an astronomer and geometrician, was the leader in a movement to federalize the Ionian Greeks and a monopolist in food stuffs. Of the semi-mythical Pythagoras we are permitted to believe that his order controlled the political power in Kroton. "The history of the Pythagorean order," says Burnet, "so far as it can be traced, is . . . the history of an attempt to supersede the State; and its political action is to be explained as a mere incident of that attempt" (*op. cit.*, p. 98).

A definite attitude toward society, and particularly toward that element for whom governments are sometimes said to exist, is first exhibited by Xenophanes. It is an attitude which runs through the later Greek philosophers including Aristotle. Driven out of his birthplace, a wanderer over the face of the earth, he finally found a refuge at Hieron's court. He was certainly no favorite of the people who, he said, honored the athlete at the expense of the philosopher, and who, in their ignorance, projected themselves into the personalities of their gods. The people and popular opinion became the two *bêtes noires* of the Greek thinkers, and when Plato came to write his *Republic*, one sees them merging in the body politic—its worst element.

Heracleitus's life is a sealed book, but he may be credited with royal descent and with having "resigned the nominal position of Basileus in favor of his brother" (Burnet, p. 144). His opinion of his fellow citizens is best expressed in the fragment, "The Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every grown man of them, and leave the city to beardless lads; for they have cast out Hermadorus, the best man among them, saying, 'We will have none who is best among us; if there be any such, let him go elsewhere and among others'" (R. P., 296; Burnet, 154). His opinion of the people in general is not much

higher. "For what thought or wisdom have they? They follow the poets and take the crowd as their teacher, knowing not that there are many bad and few good. For even the best of them choose one thing above all others, immortal glory among mortals, while most of them are glutted like beasts" (R. P., 31a; Burnet, p. 154).⁴ Parmenides, the traditional antithesis of Heracleitus, "like most of the older philosophers, took part in politics; and Speusippos recorded that he legislated for his native city. Others add that the magistrates of Elea made the citizens swear every year to abide by the laws which Parmenides had given them" (Burnet, p. 195). The structure of his poem indicates what he thought of human opinion, although it says little enough about humanity at large.

Empedocles seems to have been more of a popular leader. He lived in troubled times in Sicily and certainly played a part in them. Burnet (pp. 230-231) gives two anecdotes to illustrate his method of dealing with tyrants and oligarchs, and ends this part of his account by saying, "He was offered the kingship which Aristotle tells us he refused. At any rate, we see that Empedocles was the great democratic leader at Akragas in those days, though we have no clear knowledge of what he did." It will be noticed that of all the Greek philosophers, the one who taught that human beings were but the accidental fitting together of odd arms and legs and other organs, and that monsters were as likely to have been produced as normalities, was the one popular leader. His philosophy was from the monistic point of view chaotic, a conglomeration of superstition, myth, observation, imaginative guesses, what not. He is hailed as the great charlatan of ancient times. And yet he is traditionally the great democrat. Benn, for in-

⁴ See Burnet's discussion of the three lives, p. 108f, "In this life there are three kinds of men, just as there are three sorts of people who come to the Olympic Games. The lowest class is made up of those who come to buy and sell, and next above them are those who come to compete. Best of all, however, are those who come simply to look on (*θεωπεῖν*)."

stance, says of him, "[His verses'] speculative content exhibits a distinct decline from the height reached by his immediate predecessors. Empedocles betrays a distrust in man's power of discovering truth, almost, although not quite, unknown to them. Too much certainty would be impious. . . . We also miss in him the single-minded devotion to philosophy and their vigorous unity of doctrine. The Acragantine sage was a party leader (in which capacity, to his great credit, he victoriously upheld the popular cause), a rhetorician, an engineer, a physician, and a thaumaturgist. . . . Half-mystic and half-rationalist, he made no attempt to reconcile the two inconsistent sides of his intellectual character" (*op. cit.*, I, p. 27 *et seq.*). He is the one thinker of these times whose work is stubbornly pluralistic, and who seems almost to revel in the variety and diversity of his conception.

When we come to Anaxagoras we are back on familiar ground. We are told that both his and his father's names "have an aristocratic sound, and we may assume they belonged to a family which had won distinction in the State" (Burnet, p. 291). He went, we know, to Athens, not however because "he was attracted thither by anything in the character of the Athenians. No doubt Athens had now become the political center of the Hellenic world; but it had not yet produced a single scientific man" (*ibid.*, p. 294). He seems to have been brought to Athens to adorn the court of Pericles, much as Alcuin was brought to France to adorn that of Charlemagne. He was tried by the Athenians and "for the rest, the most plausible account is that he was got out of prison and sent away by Pericles" (*ibid.*, p. 297). Accounts, however, vary—even to the extent of saying on the one hand that he was sentenced to pay a fine of five talents, to saying on the other hand, that he was sentenced to death (*ibid.*, 297, n. 1).

The later Pythagoreans were no less active in politics

than the founders of the order. "In the fourth century the chief seat of the school is at Taras, and we find the Pythagoreans heading the opposition to Dionysios of Syracuse. It is to this period that Archytas belongs. He was the friend of Plato, and almost realized, if he did not suggest, the ideal of the philosopher king. He ruled Taras for years, and Aristoxenos tells us that he was never defeated in the field of battle" (*ibid.*, 319-320). The same is true of the Eleatics. "Like Parmenides and most other early philosophers, Zeno seems to have played a part in the politics of his native city. Strabo ascribes to him some share of the credit for the good government of Elea. . . . We hear also that Zeno conspired against a tyrant, whose name is differently given" (*ibid.*, 358). His fellow Parmenidean, Melissus of Samos, was a general in the army which defeated the Athenian fleet in 441-440 B. C. (*ibid.*, 369).

There is no need of going on with this catalog. Scarcely any philosopher has come down to us without some mention of his political connections. We have deliberately taken Burnet's account of these men's lives because it is at once the most sober and the most skeptical. One has only to compare it with Gompertz's to see how little he has drawn upon his personal imagination when it was not a question of omitting something. On the lives of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle it is useless to comment here. The broad lines are known to all, however doubtful the details. Socrates, not having been a metaphysician does not come into our discussion. Plato, after the death of Socrates, certainly felt no love for Athens and the Athenians. If the *Republic* is in any sense of the word a criticism of his city the last half of the eighth book ought to dispel any illusions a man might have about his faith in the people.

"Do you really think, as people are fond of saying, that our youth are corrupted by the Sophists, or that individual

Sophists corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the public who say these things the greatest of all Sophists? And do they not educate to perfection alike young and old, men and women, and fashion them after their own heart? . . . When they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a court of law, or a theater, or a camp, or at some other place of resort, and there is a great uproar, and they praise some things that are said or done, and blame other things, equally exaggerating in both, shouting and clapping their hands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled redoubles the sound of the praise or blame—at such a time will not a young man's heart leap within him? Will the influence of education stem the tide of praise or blame, and not rather be carried away in the stream? And will he not have the notions of good and evil which the public in general have—he will do as they do, and as they are, such will he be?" (*Rep.*, 492.)

Such words are not the words of a democrat either in a theory or in practice. Like the expressions of his predecessors which are relevant and extant, they are the words of a social critic with a bias toward aristocracy. All of these men either despise the crowd, like Heracleitus or Xenophanes, or rule it, like Zeno. Empedocles alone seems to have cultivated it. But like the others, he expresses no love for its wildness, no pity for its ignorance. It is an enemy to order, a friend to change, to irrationality. The crowd in turn retaliates with banishments, fines and executions. It is in the relation of the philosophers to society that we find the best clue to their monistic predispositions.

As early as Thales's time Greek civilization was passing through what historians call gloomy straits. The myth of the passing of the Golden Age and the degradation of social values was being verified. The *Polykoiranie*, to which the staunch Odysseus objected with such vehemence was

being realized. The power of the one ruler to whom Zeus had given the scepter had passed into the hands of the nobles. Hesiod had written the record of his depression and Archilochos was adding his bitterness to the literature of this time.

Bury says of this period in his larger history of Greece,⁵

“At first the privileged classes of the aristocratic republics benefited by the increase of commerce; for the nobles were themselves the chief speculators. But the wealth which they acquired by trade undermined their political position. For, in the first place, their influence depended largely on their domains of land; and when industries arose to compete with agriculture, the importance of land necessarily declined. In the second place, wealth introduced a new political standard; and aristocracies resting on birth tended to transform themselves into aristocracies resting on wealth. The proverb ‘money makes the man’ now came into vogue. As nobility by birth cannot be acquired, whereas wealth can, such a change is always a step in the direction of democracy.

“On the other hand, the poorer freemen at first suffered. How heavily the transition from the old systems of exchange to the use of money bore upon them, we shall find illustrated when we come to the special history of Athens. But their distress and discontent drove them into striving for full political equality, and in many cases they strove with success. The second half of the seventh century (i. e., just before the Milesians) is marked in many parts of Greece by struggles between the classes; and the wiser and better of the nobles began to see the necessity of extending political privileges to their fellow citizens. The centralization in towns, owing to the growth of industries and the declining importance of agriculture, created a new

⁵ *History of Greece*, 2 vols., London, 1902, Vol. I, pp. 122 *et seq.*

town population and doubtless helped on the democratic movement."

Even in Sparta, which with its conservative constitution might have been expected to resist innovation, there was a growth of popular strength, and it is suggested that so apparently remote a thing as the introduction of light-armed infantry into the army was a step toward democracy, since it permitted the poor man as well as the rich to equip himself for battle (Bury, I, p. 136). Yet Sparta moved toward suppression of the new voices by running her house in the military manner.

"When Sparta emerges into the full light of history we find her under an iron discipline, which invades every part of a man's life and controls all his actions from his cradle to his death-bed. . . . As a city ruling over a large discontented population of subjects and serfs, she must always be prepared to fight. . . . Though the Helots were not driven by taskmasters, and had the right of acquiring private property, their condition seems to have been hard; at all events, they were always bitterly dissatisfied and ready to rebel, whenever an occasion presented itself. The system of Helotry was a source of danger from the earliest times. . . . and the state of constant military preparation in which the Spartans lived may have been partly due to the consciousness of this peril perpetually at their doors. The *Krypteia* or secret police was instituted. . . . to deal with this danger. Young Spartans were sent into the country and empowered to kill every Helot whom they had reason to regard with suspicion. Closely connected with this system was the remarkable custom that the ephors, in whose hands lay the general control over the Helots, should every year on entering office proclaim war against them. By this device, the youths could slay dangerous Helots without any scruple or fear of the guilt of manslaughter. But notwithstanding these precautions se-

rious revolts broke out again and again." (Bury, I, pp. 137f.)

It was the constitution of this State which Plato admired, living as he did, after the Periclean Age.

With the breakdown of monarchy and the rise of trade, with the consequent appearance of all that is ugly and distressing in commercial life, the loss of the regal manner and personal loyalty, which never fails to be touching even when wasted, the beauty of courts and courtly entertainment, came the new era when men grew uneasy at the sight of so much change. It was at this time when they began to inquire into its cause and to assume without question that beneath it all was some permanent substance on which they could base their hopes. It was as if they were sure that somewhere there was something enduring and reliable if only they could find it. Upon the tablets of Delphi had been engraved the words "Nothing in excess," and we are prone to look upon them as the devout expression of moderate men. And in a sense they were. But uttered in the late seventh century that serene and temperate air is lost, and they sound rather as a warning to a people moving too fast. It was as if they were sounding a halt to the impetuous flight from the old and tried toward the new and unknown.

That men felt the passing of things and the speed of change is evidenced—if not by the poets alone—by the codifying of laws. Throughout the ancient world almost simultaneously the lawgivers arose, Zaleucus, Charondas, Draco, Solon. It is in this movement that Bury sees the beginning of a "long political conflict" (I. p. 154), which resulted here in success for the democrats and here failure, with a predominant instability and swinging from democratic to oligarchical forms of government.

The great advantage of a codified law is of course obvious. Law which is admittedly only the opinion of a magis-

trate varies in justice with the magistrate. We are prone to look upon the modern state's loss of sovereignty and the law's gain of it as a blessing for the governed.⁶ A written law, we feel, has lost its arbitrariness. That is indubitably true, but it has also lost its flexibility. A codified law is permanent; it is codified in order to be permanent; and it is improbable that the ancient lawmakers differed very much in their motives from the moderns. The laws of ancient Greece were not noted for their liberality. They were as much an instrument of conservation as of justice. No wonder then that the tyrants, who overthrew them, found an ally in the people. Bury (I, p. 155) seems to think that the people "were not ripe for taking the power into their own hands; and they were glad to entrust it to the man who had helped them to overthrow the hated government of the nobles." But it is hardly likely that any people ever surrendered rights and privileges because of a feeling of immaturity or inability. The desire for autonomy is usually a pretty effective balance for modesty. However unjustified the people may have been in their revolutions, the satisfaction of their demands has always necessitated the amendment of written law.

But such changes were naturally disagreeable to the aristocratic type of mind. One might venture to say that the most unpleasant feature of a tyrant was his friendship for the mob, the arbitrariness of his rule, the lack of consistency in his behavior, rather than his autocracy. But of course a tyrant must be inconsistent if he is to keep his power. For there is nothing consistent and fixed about human life except norms and as Royce pointed out to the satisfaction of Christians and Cynics alike, it requires an eternity to live out the life devoted to their cultivation. Machiavelli, it will be remembered, suggests that "a pru-

⁶ Cf. L. Duguit, *Law in the Modern State*, tr. by F. and H. Laski, New York, 1919, especially Ch. VII.

dent lord cannot and ought not to keep his word when such an observance would be contrary to his interests and the occasion of his promise is removed."⁷ But to a person who hates caprice and who moves restlessly in an environment which is fluid, such a situation is intolerable and such a rule loathsome. The philosophers of Greece were just such people.

The one Greek philosopher as we have seen above, who said nothing of this, was Empedocles, a demagog and a pluralist whose universe was controlled by love and hate. The one Greek philosopher who had no political connections, as far as we know, Democritus, was an atomist. But their philosophies practically died. The desire for the permanent, the stable, the something substantial and sovereign continued. It survived in all systematic metaphysics. It survived in Plato's ideals which were sovereign, eternal, immutable. It survived in Aristotle's substance. It survived in the Stoic and Epicurean Sages who were alone above change. Throughout the Middle Ages it practically made political science. It survived in the whole seventeenth-century conception of sovereignty and in the eighteenth-century conception of natural law. In the nineteenth century it began to appear as the characteristics of the written legislation and sometimes as the laws of science—"some call it evolution and others call it God."

But as a mere theory, a formal doctrine, like a system of mathematical propositions, it could never have acted as a spur to behavior. It must have been found consonant with someone's tastes, needs, ambitions, aspirations, what you will. To insist that men live the life eternal because they are Christians is not much different from insisting that some ape had to read the *Descent of Man* before the human race could evolve, or that only a thorough drilling in astral physics keeps the planets from colliding.

⁷ *Il Principe*, ed. by L. A. Burd, Oxford, 1891, Ch. XVIII, pp. 300 *et seq.*

The tendency toward the permanent, the Eleatic, is a sort of intellectual tropism which can no more be controlled by minds subject to it, than can the heliotropism of certain plants by the plants affected. It exhibits itself in all fields where a norm enters, which will be all fields where human beings come in contact with one another. The Church realized its importance almost in the earliest days of church history. The history of papal supremacy illustrates it perfectly and because most readers have few illusions about the Church, it will undoubtedly be admitted in this case at least that it was not so much a description of facts as the expression of a wish.

From the beginning of the Christian sects to the present day the Church has never existed as a unified body. It has had to fight schism and rebellion from the beginning of time. And yet Catholic doctrine as given in Denzinger's beautiful *Enchiridion* (p. 583) runs something like this. "The Church is a society instituted by Christ the Lord, constituting one body mystical under Christ as a head. It is a supernatural society, perfect and independent, visible and knowable from signs inherent in it, which distinguish it from other religious companies. It is a hierarchy, a monarchy, i. e., constituted under one head having the supreme power: it is therefore one, holy, catholic, apostolic; is necessary to all for salvation. . . . and for the remission of sins; it is perpetual; to it was given the treasury of the merits of Christ. . . . The Church is not divided in two, into carnal and spiritual, or into three branches, Roman-Catholic, Græco-Schismatic, and Anglican."⁸

One could make a perfect parallel between this and Plotinus's World of Ideas. They too are divine in origin, being the thoughts of the second person of his Trinity,

⁸ I have omitted Denzinger's page references by which he establishes each point.

the Nous.⁹ The World of Ideas is supernatural, existing above the world of sense. But it too is knowable. Just as Pius IX in his epistle "*Tuas libenter*" (*Enchir.* No. 1681) said that Catholics ought to have divine revelation as a guiding star before their eyes when engaged in natural science, so Plotinus teaches that discursive reason is good only up to a certain point; that after that point the soul should know intuitively. The Plotinian world is most decidedly a hierarchy from several points of view, dominated by the One. It has not the religious power of remitting sin for obvious reasons. But it was a unified group of individuals and a catholic group in which schism was as impossible as in the Church.

I do not mean to say that the Church is modelled upon the Plotinian universe. I wish to suggest that it is an expression of similar intellectual needs. From the formulation of the Apostle's Creed to the Fourth Session of the Twentieth Ecumenical Council tradition emphasized this. It emphasized what was eleaticism. It is repeated in creed after creed, "Especially do we believe in the one catholic and apostolic church." The uniqueness of the Church was declared as early as the sixth century when Pelagius II in his epistle to the schismatic bishops of Istria (*Quos ad dilectionem*) referred doubters to Matthew xvi where Peter is given the keys of heaven and ordained to be the rock upon which the Church will be built. But it was actually no more unique than it is now. In fact this letter was occasioned because of the existence of a schism. Yet the Pope was on the way to making it unique by damning and anathematizing those who thought or believed or presumed to teach against its uniqueness (*ibid.*). It was Plato's gesture of forbidding all but geometers to enter the Academy. Plato, however, never went so far as to prove the non-existence

⁹ Cf. F. Picavet's *Hypostases Plotiniennes et Trinité Chrétienne*, Paris, 1917.

of non-geometers by excluding them from his society. Of course there was the argument of self-preservation impelling Pelagius as it impelled his successors. So St. Nicholas I defended the Church's immunity and independence in his epistle "*Proposueramus quidem*" to the Emperor Michael, circa 865, with the proud words, "Neither by Augustus, nor by all the clergy, nor by kings, nor by the people, shall the judge be judged. . . . *Prima sedes non iudicabitur a quoquam*" (*Enchir.* No. 330). The Church had been given to Peter and there was no higher authority than the Apostolic See. Leo IX in his epistle "*Congratulamur vehementer*" (*Enchir.* No. 347) to Peter, Bishop of Antioch, in 1053, reaffirmed the holiness, catholicity, unity, and truth of the Apostolic Church. By the time of Callixtus II, who was pope from 1119 to 1124, the Ninth Ecumenical Council had decided that so independent, which meant self-dependent, was the Church, that neither prince, nor other layman, no matter how religious, could have a voice in her affairs (*Enchir.* No. 361). She was her own mistress; she was acknowledged to be sovereign.

It is then that she is completely eleatic and it is then that she can be admitted by all to be *semper eadem*, of which Mr. Laski makes so much in his essay on *De Maistre and Bismarck*, a fine example of the same philosophy in two men who were fighting for opposite ends. If that quality of immutability can be proved, it seems to be sufficient to win the obedience of all the members of the Church and an added proof of its authority and sovereignty. The more one studies the bulls, epistles, decretals and other pronouncements in the *Enchiridion* the more one sees the importance of this argument and its central position in the Catholic Faith. It is taken for granted, one might say, that a thing which is not susceptible to change is somehow more valuable than one which is. But one should never forget that the admission of change—an admission which

no pope has granted—involves perhaps the admission that the change is for some end, better or worse than the existing state of affairs, which would be ruinous. But it would be ruinous practically. There is undoubtedly a greater value attached by people to old and lasting things than to new and fleeting things. But has anyone to date been able to explain why? The proof the Church has usually advanced of her own permanence has been John xxi. 15 ff. But the value of that proof is again largely practical. Let us waive the question of whether any proof is any more than that.

The faith in the eleatic nature of the Church was repeated periodically throughout the years, although no new argument was adduced to substantiate it. It was repeated, for instance, by Innocent III in his epistle "*Eius exemplo*," in 1208, (*Enchir.* No. 423) as one of the admissions prescribed for the recantation of the Waldenses. It was reaffirmed under the same Pope's auspices at the Twelfth Ecumenical Council, 1215 (*Enchir.* No. 430).¹⁰ It was naturally emphasized in the Fourteenth Ecumenical Council which actually succeeded in unifying the East and West for a few years—nor was it renounced when they broke loose later—and was a special article of faith in the profession of faith proposed by Clement IV to the Emperor Michael Palæologus¹¹ which was adopted at the same council. (*Enchir.* No. 464; cf. 466). It reached a splendid climax when Boniface VIII took it seriously in his Bull "*Unam Sanctam*," of November 18, 1302.¹² The argument was

¹⁰ But at the same time Walther von der Vogelweide was hymning the same traits in his lord and master, Otto IV. See Luchaire's *Innocent III, la papauté et l'empire*, Paris, 1906, pp. 9f.

¹¹ See *Enchir.*, p. 201, n. 2.

¹² There is a dispute about this date. See Hefele's *History of the Councils*, French transl. by Dom H. Leclercq, Vol. VI, Paris, 1914, p. 423. The whole Bull is a matter of argument. For its authenticity see Hefele, *ibid.*, p. 427, n. 1; 428, n. 2. Also H. Finke's *Aus den Tagen Bonifaz VIII*, Münster, 1902, Ch. IV, esp. gloss., p. C. There is an apology for it worth seeing in the *Pouvoir du Pape au moyen âge*, Paris, 1845, pp. 569ff, by "M. . . ., Directeur au Séminaire de St. Sulpice."

given a new illumination by this most Hamiltonian of Popes, through setting it in the light of the Old as well as the New Testament. Does not Christ in the *Song of Songs* vi. 9) show the graces of the Church in the glowing words, "My dove, my undefiled is but one; she is the only one of her mother"? "She," says the Pope, represents "the body mystical of which the head is Christ." Furthermore, during the Flood, Noah had but one Arch, which had one helmsman; all else was blotted out. The Church is the seamless garment of the Lord. "Therefore, the one and only Church had one body, one head, and not two heads like a monster; Christ, and Christ's vicar, Peter, and Peter's successor, since the Lord said to Peter himself. 'Feed my sheep' (John xxi. 17). Mine, he said, and mine in general, not singularly these and those; by which he is understood to have taken to himself all sheep."

But at this point the Bull proceeds to derive some practical value out of it all. The Pope takes up the figure of the two swords, the spiritual and the temporal. It is true that there are two, one in the hands of the Church, the other in the hands of the kings and soldiers, *sed ad nutum et patientiam sacerdotis*. Therefore temporal power must submit to spiritual power, the king to the pope—something which Philip the Fair felt was hardly feasible. If the State, furthermore, err, she must be judged by the Church; but if the Church err, she can be judged by God alone.¹³ This is undoubtedly the height of the argument, for in it one has the presentation not only of all the eleatic qualities of the Church, but also of the consequences which follow. That which is single, immutable and self-dependent—sovereign—is supreme among societies and authorita-

¹³ See Gierke's *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, tr. by F. W. Maitland, Cambridge, 1913, p. 104, n. 9, for valuable material on this argument.

tive. The Church is hardly to be distinguished from the Plotinian One.¹⁴

None of the popes have explained why that which was eleatic should exact obedience, and one would be hard put to it to give any good reason for it. It is simple to understand why that which wishes to exact obedience and associated values should attempt to prove that it is eleatic. It is the sort of thing one finds in all systems where devout allegiance is demanded from "Thou shalt have no other gods before me" to the days of "*Deutschland über Alles*." It is only proper that a king should deny the existence of other possible kings; or that a supreme God should deny the existence of other gods. Having proved uniqueness, it is an easy step to eternity and to immutability. For all the eleatic qualities are highly useful in preventing the dissipation of power. Dante in his *De Monarchia* (Bk. I, ch. 5)¹⁵ invites attention to the proverbial curse, "May you have a peer in your house," which he poetically interprets as the imposition of an unnatural and hence base situation on the ruler. From it he easily argues for a monarchy. It is a simple matter after that, by an obvious and thoroughly Platonic abstraction, to treat the unity as the important point and the thing unified as unimportant. What this type of mind could do is better illustrated in the ninth chapter. The good son, Dante reasons, should follow his Father. Man is the son of Heaven; therefore he should

¹⁴ Between Boniface VIII and Pius IX little is done about the Eleatic qualities of the Church except the Bull "*Cantate Domino*" of Eugene IV, Feb. 4, 1441, esp. *Enchir.* No. 714; and the Bull of Pius IV "*Iniunctum nobis*," Nov. 13, 1564, esp. *Enchir.* No. 999.

Under Pius IX, see his encyclical to the bishops of England, Sept. 16, 1864, against the Society for Procuring Christian Unity; his encyclical "*Etsi multa luctuosa*," Nov. 21, 1873; the allocution "*Luctuosis exagitati*," March 12, 1887. In Pius IX no one will admit that the arguments are purely theoretical.

His successors have not relinquished the argument. See Leo XIII's encyclical "*Satis cognitum*," June 29, 1896, and his epistle to Cardinal Gibbons, "*Testem benevolentiae*," esp. *Enchir.* No. 1975ff, which condemns the idea of an American Church. Add to this Pius X's decretal "*Lamentabili*," July 3, 1907, directed against the Modernists, esp. Arts. 53, 56, 58, 60, 65, and the matter is brought fairly up to date.

¹⁵ Eng. tr. by Philip H. Wicksteed in the *Temple Classics*, p. 140.

follow Heaven. But all the Heaven is governed by a single motion and a single mover, the *primum mobile* and God. It follows then that mankind should be governed by a single prince as the single mover and a single law as the single motion. Hence there should be one emperor for the whole world.

Dante has a sort of reverence for unity. "Being," he says, "naturally precedes 'oneness' and 'oneness' naturally precedes 'good'; for that which is most existent is most one, and what is most one is most good. And the further anything is removed from the supremely existent the further is it removed from being one, and therefore from being good. Therefore in every kind of things, that is best which is most one. . . . Whence it comes about that 'being one' is seen to be the root of 'being good,' and 'being many' the root of 'being bad'¹⁶. . . . Hence it may be seen that sinning is naught else than despising and departing from 'unity' and seeking multiplicity. It is clear, then that everything which is good, is good in virtue of consisting in unity" (*Ibid.*, Bk.I, Ch. 15). How easy it is then for him to argue that we must have a unity of wills, and that that can come about only by the domination of one will, which is that of a single prince. "Now," he concludes, "if all the above deductions are sound, which they are, it is necessary for the best disposition of the human race that there should be a monarch in the world, and therefore for the well-being of the world that there should be a monarchy" (*Ibid.*).¹⁷ This type of reasoning is hopelessly medieval, one will say, and yet its imaginative character is even excelled by that of some more recent writers.

Is not Bluntschli's analogy between the state and a

¹⁶ Cf. the Abbé Lantaigne in Anatole France's *L'orme du mail*, pp. 214 et seq.

¹⁷ The translator here gives a suggestive reference to the *Paradiso* "in which the whole universe is depicted as a unity."

living organism as fantastic?¹⁸ He says he will not consider the food-hunting and digestive proclivities of animals, nor their power of reproduction. He is content with the following, (*a*) their being a combination of soul and body, (*b*) their forming a whole whose organs have proper functions to fulfill in order to satisfy the vital needs of the body, (*c*) their organic growth. This would be a mere figure of speech, were it not that Bluntschli actually utilizes it as an argument. In his discussion of the relation of Church to State, e.g., the Church is feminine, the State masculine. Hence the Church can have no sovereignty nor would she wish any; she merely wishes to serve God and perform her religious duties—which throws light on the German idea of female character as well as of politics, (*Op. cit.*, p. 23).¹⁹ No one could object to this if it were merely figurative language, but to Bluntschli at any rate the metaphor loses its metaphorical value and is treated literally.

Whatever may have been Dante's reason for his worship of unity, assuming that he had reasons, Bluntschli's could easily be traced to the desire for a German empire. When he begins to argue against the liberation of women (Ch. XX) one sees more than the theorist, one sees the strong father and master in his own house. First, he says, the universal usage of civilized peoples is against equal rights; second, the feminine nature, the sweet virtues of wife and mother, would naturally suffer from the toil and travail of politics; third the virile nature of the State would be corrupted; fourth, the passive moral forces would be

¹⁸ *Lehre vom modernen Staat*, Stuttgart, 1875, Vol. I, p. 19.

¹⁹ Human beings have always looked upon the State as a sort of super-human being with anthropomorphic traits. Every one knows that it goes back to the *Republic* at least (Bks. III, IV, V), and I venture to suggest that it survives in our constitution with its separation of powers into executive, judiciary, and legislative. I have not been able to find in a hasty reading of Montesquieu made for another purpose an avowal of this analogy, but one who knows faculty psychology would have no trouble in constructing it for himself. The point is that whenever we deal with single things, whenever we handle individuals, we read into them the traits of the human individual. The evolution of Aristotle's Substance into Jehovah is a case in point.

increased, the active weakened, since women are more impressionable than men. Finally, it is one of the provisions of public law "especially among the German people that the wife is made a participant in the political honor and majesty of her husband. There lies therein a recognition of the true indirect relation of the women to the organism of the State, and a worthy substitute for the participation in properly political rights denied them" (p. 234). Again in his theory of the birth of states through *organische Staatstrieb* and *Staatsbewusstsein*, he shows himself much more than the political scientist in his abundant love for the existing order. His theory, much like Dante's is optative rather than indicative.²⁰

But we must reserve a discussion of eleatic theories of the state for another moment. Like the excerpts from the papal pronouncements, Bluntschli and Dante simply serve here as examples of the same temperament. The lesson is for the student of philosophy. Philosophy becomes a very curious activity if it is a type of self-expression which consists in reading into the universe either one's own ambitions or one's own actual character. Criticism of philosophy in that case would be more closely akin to criticism of art than of science—a conclusion that a man like Croce would probably welcome. Even Fouillée with his notion that the philosopher seeks "the totality of possible experience"²¹ believes that the constructive part of philosophy is essentially artistic. "But," he adds justly enough, "he, [the philosopher], ought never to confuse his divinations with his inductions."

The logic of this type of philosophy is Ribot's *logique des sentiments* rather than his *logique de la raison*. Indeed

²⁰ See in particular Bk. V, Ch. 4. As Professor Coker rather plaintively remarks, "The value of such a system as an illustrative expedient would depend on its appeal to an imagination of a similar type to that of the artificer's."—*Organismic Theories of the State*, New York, 1910, p. 198.

²¹ *L'avenir de la métaphysique*, Paris, 1890, Pt. I, Ch. 5, pp. 79ff.

Ribot believes that that is just what it is. He shows to his own satisfaction that the impulse toward metaphysical imagination is a need of *total explanation*. "It is not an attempt made upon a limited group of phenomena, but a conjecture about the ensemble of things, an aspiration towards completely unified knowledge, a need of final explanation, which for certain spirits is as compelling as any other. This need expresses itself by the creation of a cosmic or human hypothesis, constructed ordinarily according to the type and procedure of scientific hypothesis; but which, radically subjective in its origin, is objective only in appearance. It is a rationalized myth."²² This is no disproof of metaphysical theories; it is obviously merely an explanation of their genesis. And in his *Logique des Sentiments*, Ribot points out clearly how valuable they are. The logic of feelings may not discover what is known as the truths of the reason, but it effects its end more serviceably and loyally than the reason itself. That is why the law of contradiction has so little place in the formulation of metaphysical systems. I omit a discussion of where it has a place.

GEORGE BOAS.

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²² *Essai sur l'imagination créatrice*, Paris, 1900, pp. 210f.